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Abstract 
Introduction:  This paper is a product of the research Project “A technological analysis of Colombia’s cyber-
security capacity: a systemic perspective from an organizational point of view” developed at the Universidad 
Pontificia	Bolivariana	in	the	year	2018.
Objective: Starting from the Dynamics System paradigm, this study considers the technological dimension with 
respect to cybersecurity for incident response and critical infrastructure protection, making reference to the 
Cybersecurity	Capability	Maturity	Model	and	the	best	practices	defined	by	the	National	Institute	of	Standards	
and	Technology	-	NIST.
Methodology: The research starts from the dynamics hypothesis and using the representation of a formal 
simulation model as its input so as to analyze different scenarios and the development of future policy in this 
field.
Conclusions: The risk at the organizational level represents a fundamental element for management of inci-
dents	and	the	protection	of	critical	infrastructures,	since	it	allows	defining	the	necessary	strategies,	in	terms	
of policies, guidelines, business rules, technology and other elements that allow the country to face the threats 
derived	from	interconnectivity.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	develop	policies	aimed	at	organizational	sensitivity	
in terms of cybersecurity risks.
Originality: The scenarios that we propose should assist decision makers in making investments in favor of the 
development and evolution of Cybersecurity in Colombia and, therefore, of the organizations that contribute to 
the development of the country.
Restrictions: The	data	we	used	to	conclude	this	study,	was	obtained	from	an	organization	that	 is	classified	
as critical to infrastructure, so it is important to obtain access to the information of the main organization in 
Colombia in charge of cybersecurity and other companies.
Keywords:	Cybersecurity,	Incident	Response,	Critical	Infrastructure,	System	Dynamics.
Resumen
Introducción: Este artículo es producto del proyecto de investigación “Análisis de la capacidad de ciberseguri-
dad para la dimensión tecnológica en Colombia: una mirada sistémica desde la organización” desarrollado en 
la	Universidad	Pontificia	Bolivariana	en	el	año	2018.
Objetivo: Partiendo del paradigma de simulación de la dinámica de sistemas, éste estudio aborda la dimensión 
tecnológica de la ciberseguridad referido a la respuesta a incidentes y protección de infraestructuras críticas, 
tomando como referencia el Modelo de Madurez de la Capacidad de Ciberseguridad y las mejores prácticas 
definidas	por	el	Instituto	Nacional	de	Estándares	y	Tecnología	(NIST).	
Metodología: Se parte de la formulación de unas hipótesis dinámicas y la representación de un modelo formal 
de simulación como medio para el análisis de escenarios y formulación de políticas en este campo.
Conclusión: El nivel de riesgo organizacional, representa un elemento fundamental para la respuesta a in-
cidentes	y	la	protección	de	infraestructuras	críticas,	dado	que	permite	definir	 las	estrategias	necesarias,	en	
términos de políticas, directrices, reglas de negocios, tecnología y otros elementos que contribuyen enfrentar 
las amenazas derivadas de la interconectividad. Es necesario desarrollar políticas dirigidas a la sensibilidad 
organizacional en términos de riesgos de ciberseguridad.
Originalidad: los escenarios propuestos deben contribuir a los tomadores de decisiones para hacer inversiones 
a favor del desarrollo y la evolución de la ciberseguridad en Colombia y, por lo tanto, de las organizaciones que 
contribuyen al fortalecimiento del país.
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Restricciones: los datos utilizados para concluir en este estudio se obtuvieron de una organización que está 
clasificada	como	infraestructura	crítica,	por	lo	que	es	importante	obtener	acceso	a	la	información	de	la	organi-
zación	principal	de	Colombia	encargada	de	la	ciberseguridad	y	de	otras	compañías.
Palabras clave: ciberseguridad, respuesta a incidentes, infraestructuras críticas, dinámica de sistemas.  
Resumo
Introdução: Este artigo é um produto do projeto de pesquisa “Análise da capacidade de segurança cibernética 
para a dimensão tecnológica na Colômbia: uma visão sistêmica da organização” desenvolvida na Universidad 
Pontifícia	Bolivariana	no	ano	de	2018.
Objetivo: Partindo do paradigma da Dinâmica de Sistemas, este estudo considera a dimensão tecnológica da 
segurança cibernética para resposta a incidentes e proteção da infraestrutura crítica, tendo como referência 
o	Modelo	de	Maturidade	da	Capacidade	de	Cibersegurança	e	as	melhores	práticas	definidas	pelo	 Instituto	
Nacional	de	Padrões	e	Tecnologia	-	NIST.	
Metodologia: Partimos da hipótese da dinâmica e da representação de um modelo formal de simulação como 
insumo para analisar diferentes cenários e desenvolvimento de políticas futuras neste campo.
Conclusões: o nível de risco organizacional representa um elemento fundamental para a gestão de incidentes 
e	proteção	de	infraestruturas	críticas,	pois	permite	definir	as	estratégias	necessárias,	em	termos	de	políticas,	
diretrizes, regras de negócio, tecnologia e outros elementos que permitam enfrentar as ameaças derivadas da 
interconectividade. Portanto, é necessário desenvolver políticas voltadas para a sensibilidade organizacional 
em termos de riscos de segurança cibernética.
Originalidade: os cenários que propomos devem servir aos tomadores de decisão para fazer investimentos em 
favor	do	desenvolvimento	e	evolução	da	segurança	cibernética	na	Colômbia	e,	portanto,	das	organizações	que	
contribuem para o desenvolvimento do país.
Restrições: os dados que usamos para concluir neste estudo, foi obtido a partir de uma organização que é 
classificada	como	infraestrutura	crítica,	é	importante	para	obter	acesso	à	informação	pública	na	concepção	da	
empresa	principal	para	gerenciamento	de	segurança	cibernética	na	Colômbia	e	outras	organizações.
Palavras-chave: segurança cibernética, resposta a incidentes, infraestrutura crítica, dinâmica do sistema.
Introduction 
Cybersecurity as a general concept has been gaining relevance because of its stra-
tegic importance, both for citizens and society, for companies and for the country. 
In 1988 the government of the United States created the first Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT), after the MORT worm paralyzed a portion of the Internet 
[1]. Estonia’s government suffered what is known as the biggest cyber-attack in his-
tory, where the presidency, the parliament, the ministries and two large banks were 
affected [2]. In July 2009, the government of the United States suffered attacks that 
affected the White House, the Department of Internal Security, the Department of 
Defense, among others. In 2010, the Spanish guard dismantled what, by then, was 
considered the largest Botnet or zombie computer network with more than 13 million 
IP addresses, distributed in 190 countries around the world [2].
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According to [3], “because of increasing interconnection, information systems 
and networks are more vulnerable, since they are exposed to a growing number, as 
well as to a greater variety, of threats and vulnerabilities. This creates new challenges 
that must be addressed in terms of security”.
In the same way, [4] refers to the importance of cybersecurity at the country 
level, denoting a growing increase in the budget of the nation’s objectives to address 
the issue, particularly in the United States of America, through the creation of the 
United States Cyber Command; a unified command that depends on the National 
Security Agency of the United States. 
Likewise, he denotes an increase of 8.1 %, between 2009 and 2010, of the an-
nual cybersecurity budget, which shows an acknowledgment of the risk derived from 
interconnection.
Morgan [5], estimates that 51 % of the world population in the year 2017, had 
access to the Internet, which is equivalent to 3.8 billion users, and projected that by 
2030, 90% of the population —approximately 8.5 billion people— will have such access 
which consequently increases the risks derived from interconnectivity.
Based on the Global Risk Report published in 2018, attacks on organizations 
have doubled in the last 5 years and incidents that were once considered extraordinary, 
today are much more commonplace [6]. For example, the ransomwares WannaCry 
and NotPetya, affected more than 300,000 computers in about 150 countries with 
losses close to US $ 300 million, generated risks of unavailability of services in multiple 
companies including banks, energy companies, ministries, among others.
Colombia has made evident efforts in this field, such as the generation of 
Conpes 3701 (giving life to the Colombian CERT), whose objective does not differ 
from the main definition enunciated by Cardazzone & Carlini. (n.d.), which is part of 
protecting the security of the national economy favoring the continuity of operations 
in the event of a security incident; and Conpes 3854, defining Colombia’s cybersecu-
rity policy [2], [7] to face the emerging challenges of cybersecurity. In that sense, the 
Colombian Government has developed important advances aligned with the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and Organization of American States (OAS) in 
terms of policies, legal frameworks and technology regarding cybersecurity. Similarly, 
on September 3rd, 2015, the Colombian National Operation Council (Consejo Nacional 
de Operación), considering Conpes 3701, approved the Cybersecurity guide through 
the 788 agreement. It motivates the generators, transmitters and distributors of the 
National Interconnected System to carry out the identification of critical assets and 
cyber assets, risks and vulnerabilities at the level of management of cybersecurity in 
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the operations of companies, recognizing the importance of the topic in the national 
context.
The complexity of cybersecurity in any environment, requires constant decision 
making by human beings, which can be taken even through technology. The actions 
derived from them can have short, medium or long term repercussions, so they must 
be analyzed systemically, systematically and be organized, into sets of variables or 
data (that changes constantly), recognizing the normal dynamics of cybersecurity 
in an ever-more connected world. Thus, it is necessary to address the issue using 
computer simulation, in order to make an understanding approach to the phenome-
non generated by it, from different perspectives. For this, the System Dynamics (SD) 
paradigm is a fundamental tool for modeling existing relationships within the system.
[8] uses SD to demonstrate the lack of available tools when understanding the 
existing risk of internal threats to organizations in terms of cybersecurity; making 
simulations of policies and accounting for cultural, technical and procedural factors. 
On the other hand, Cardazzone & Carlini. (n.d.) proposed a model from the SD, to 
analyze the impact of some cyber-attacks on national defense systems and the way 
in which the organizations created to counter them (CERT) have responded to them. It 
is concluded that, if it is important to have appropriate mechanisms to detect attacks, 
it is even more relevant to determine the real impact of them in order to minimize 
unforeseen damage in attacks.
Other authors such as [9] have simulated, through the same SD paradigm and 
the theoretical combination of games, cybersecurity in the protection of critical infra-
structures by defining proactive scenarios and reactive defense, recognizing attacks 
of increasing complexity for their detection and containment, concluding that “the 
cost-efficiency of periodic defenses depends on the optimization of prevention time 
components rather than IT (Information Technology) investments in recovery plans”.
Likewise, [10] conducted a study on the ecosystem of cybersecurity in Colombia, 
through the SD, affirming that the created influence diagram, helps when understand-
ing the need to prevent cybercrime, observing additionally that sovereignty is the main 
element that does not influence the other elements. However, they conclude that it 
must be the main element to be protected within the cybersecurity ecosystem in 
Colombia, along with resources and assets that may be affected by the commission 
of cybercrimes. In summary, the model shows the need to protect sovereignty and 
reduce cybercrimes within the modeled ecosystem.
This paper aims to recognize the current problem of cybersecurity, referring to 
the response to incidents and protection of critical infrastructures, as a necessary and 
indispensable element for the development of countries and organizations. A causal 
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diagram is proposed which gives a systemic view of the problem and allows for the 
modeling of existing relationships, collecting relevant elements for the management 
of cybersecurity incidents and consequently, the protection of critical infrastructures. 
This provides an approach that allows for the observation of the variables defined, the 
structure and the effects of them in the different elements, thus facilitating a discus-
sion and serving as a foundation for future works of modeling.
[11] in their study: “Cybersecurity. Are we ready in Latin America and the 
Caribbean?” present the results of the evaluation of maturity in the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean under the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CMM), 
developed by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at Oxford University, which 
includes 5 dimensions. They are:
• Policy
• Society
• Education
• Legislation
• Technology
Porrúa and Contreras therefore consider that it is necessary to analyze that 
the variables described in the CMM cannot be either static or independent, which is 
a normal dynamic within the system that should assist decision makers in makeing 
investments in favor of the development and evolution of Cybersecurity in Colombia 
and, therefore, of the organizations that contribute to the development of the country.
Materials and methods 
In order to promote understanding of the relationships that may exist in cybersecurity, 
and the complexity already mentioned, it is necessary to use tools that allow for their 
understanding and approximation through proven practices of modeling reality such 
as, for example, SD, given that, as stated by Forrester [12], these allow for the under-
standing and modeling of the real world.
In this sense, the SD provides elements that help in the understanding of reality 
to be approximated under systemic perspectives, enabling the study and elaboration 
of conclusions that facilitate the decision-making process.
For this research, a time horizon of 20 years measured in days was defined; 
the input variables and the systems and subsystems that make up the model were 
identified, and those excluded, the endogenous and exogenous variables; the Delphi 
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method was used to identify minimum and maximum times defined in the model and 
the pertinent statistical analyses were carried out. Finally, we used Vensim DSS (ver. 
6.3) of double precision for macOS.
In general, the research was carried out systematically under the exploratory 
perspective, gathering the fundamental and conceptual foundations of cybersecurity 
worldwide. For this, technological, surveillance was used to collect the main charac-
teristics associated with cybersecurity; the dynamic hypotheses were formulated, the 
elements of the system, their relationships and the flows were identified, and then a 
model was proposed through the SD associated with cybersecurity in the aforemen-
tioned aspects.
Below, the most relevant aspects of the research for this article are detailed.
To contribute to the understanding of the possible relationships existing in the 
defined problem, the cybersecurity framework created by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology of the United States (NIST), defines 5 fundamental princi-
ples. Namely: Identify, protect, detect, respond and recover, about which, [13], affirms 
that they are a useful tool for organizations when facing the risks of cybersecurity, 
seeking to face and develop continuous improvement, under international frame-
works, regarding a response to incidents.
In this sense, [14] proposes the following diagram, Figure 1, for the life cycle of 
Incident Response:
Preparation for
incident response  
Incident detection 
and analysis
Post- incident 
activity 
Incident 
containment, 
eradication and 
recovery
Figure 1. Life cycle of the incident response 
Source: adapted from[14]
At the same time, [15], in the framework for the improvement of cybersecurity 
in critical infrastructures, proposes as an additional and fundamental component, risk 
management, as an important element for decision making, for which, the level of 
organizational awareness and appetite for risk, determine the level of investment and, 
therefore, the actions to be taken when strengthening the mechanisms defined for the 
hardening of controls associated with cybersecurity.
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Since 1999, [16] proposed a series of practical recommendations, still valid, in 
order to respond to the intrusions that could arise from connectivity. In that sense, 
they highlighted the need to understand the extent and sources of the intrusion, as 
well as the imperative to protect sensitive data, systems and networks, probing for 
the continuity of the operation and recovery after an attack materialized. Similarly, the 
collection of information and evidence for subsequent investigations, including legal 
evidence, are highlighted as an important part in the handling of incidents. These 
recommendations are summarized in the Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of recommended safety practices 
Category Recommendation
Preparation
1. Establish policies and procedures to respond to intrusions
2. Preparing to respond to intrusion
Incident response
1. Analyze all available information to characterize the intrusion.
2. Communicate to all parties the progress of the intrusion and its status
3. Collect and protect the information associated with the intrusion
4. Apply short-term solutions to contain the intrusion
5. Remove all forms of access of the attacker
6. Return the system to the normal state of operation
Subsequent actions 1. Identify and implement safety lessons learned
Source: [16]
Analysis of data grouped by days 
To facilitate the understanding of the behavior of the data in this unit of measurement, 
it was decided to model them with the help of the Risk Simulator tool [17]. In that 
sense, the data was graphed, obtaining Figure 2, where the slope of the trend line is 
almost zero, assuming that there are days where no events occur:
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y = 7E-05x + 1,0108
0
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0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Figure 2 .Grouping of the data (events) obtained 
Source: own work
With the data, the following distribution adjustment —negative binomial— was 
obtained for the discrete variable “Events”, which is observed in Table 2.
Table 2. Distribution adjustment results. 
Concept Result
Fitted assumption 1,05
Distribution fitted Negative Binomial
Success required 2,00
Probability 0,70
Chi-squared 66,36
MAPE % for statistical Test 0,07%
Variable  Current Theoretical
Mean 1,05 0,87
Standard Deviation 1,23 1,12
Asymmetry 1,73 1,67
Kurtosis in exceed 4,85 3,80
Source: own work
Once the distribution was identified, random data was generated for the neg-
ative binomial distribution with required successes of 2 and a probability of 0.70, ob-
taining the graph shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Data generated for 20 years (units in days)
Source: own work
The model used this unit of measurement to perform the corresponding calcu-
lations and the respective analyses.
Times to detect, analyze and contain an  
incident and restore service 
As an international reference, the reports issued by [18], [19] show, in general, a de-
crease in times to identification and containment of security incidents, for example, 
86 days from the intrusion to the detection in the year 2014 to 49 days in 2016 —as 
shown in Table 3—, so we can conclude that response times have decreased consid-
erably, denoting a constant concern of the organizations to be more efficient in this 
regard.
Table 3.  Days from the intrusion to Detection and containment
Year Intrusion until Detection (days) Intrusion until Containment (days)
2014 86 111
2015 80,5 63
2016 49 63
Source: adapted from [18], [19]
However, in the lack of measurable response times at the organizational level 
and interest in the proposed model, we proceeded, through the Delphi method with 
experts in cybersecurity, to identify the minimum and maximum times of each of the 
variables identified in the model. For the modeling, the PERT distribution was used as 
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a reference for the generation of random numbers. According to [20], this distribution 
is a version of the Beta distribution and requires the same parameters: minimum, most 
probable and maximum and can be used when the opinion of experts is available, 
whose equation is as follows:
where,
The values defined by the experts, through a simple average, are shown in Table 4.
Table 4.	Grouping	of	time	defined	by	experts.
Min (days) Max (days)
Detection time 0,01041667 0,12268519
Analysis time 0,00810185 0,11111111
Containment time 0,07291667 1,34722222
Restore service time 0,16666667 4,33333333
Source: own work
Mode and expected value were calculated as follows:
and
With these parameters, random numbers were generated with the PERT dis-
tribution for the 20 years, measured in days, for the simulation and for each of the 
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variables. The above was developed to generate randomness in the analysis times 
and reflect a closer model to reality.
Results 
Causal diagram 
Next, the proposed causal diagram is described, which groups together the interde-
pendencies of the different variables that can be translated in the flows and levels 
model. Sterman defines the causal diagrams as simple maps that show the causal 
relationships between the variables that start from a cause and reach the effect [21]. 
On the other hand, the causal diagrams help identify the connections between the 
parts of the system, in a clear and concise way [22]. The cause - effect relationships 
are illustrated from arrows that start from the first to the last. The polarity, located in 
the upper parts of the arrows, describes the effect that the variable causes in the vari-
able effect, that is, how the variable ‘x’ —cause— influences the effect ‘y’ —effect—, 
which is denoted by the following equation:
Figure 4, groups the first subsystem, called “Preparation” and shows the pro-
posed relationships to have an approach to the problem and some relevant elements 
that precede the incidents response. As shown in cycle B1, the preparation starts from 
the perception of cybersecurity risk that an organization may have [23]. The level of risk 
that an organization can determine [24], as well as its situational awareness, will give 
rise to the definition of policies, processes and procedures [16] in order to establish 
necessary controls that favor by the reduction of the impacts if the risk materializes or 
the decrease in the probability of its occurrence [25]. Such control elements will lead 
to concrete actions such as, for example, the conformation of an incident response 
team [26] that allows facing the events that materialize [27].
The team, given the constant updating of techniques and vectors of attack, 
must periodically receive training on current trends and different methods of attack 
and containment [28]. Similarly, as seen in cycle B2, the presence of updated technolo-
gy, in this particular case understood to be both hardware and software, offers greater 
coverage to critical cyber-actors, from preparation through security baselines; hard-
ening, understood as the practice of securing systems to reduce the level of exposure 
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[25], up to the monitoring and recovery of them [29]. These elements can contribute to 
the proper functioning of incident response from the previous preparation that must 
exist. However, higher levels of preparedness for handling incidents, should tend to 
decrease the organizational risk index, not meaning that the other elements of the 
system should have the same line. In any case, it must, in a permanent way, tend to 
strengthen them.
Processes, policies and
procedures deﬁnition
Conformation of
cybersecurity team
Hardware and
Software tools
acquisition
Cybersecurity
team training
B1
B2
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
Cyber assets assurance
Organizational
cybersecurity risk
perception
Incident prevention
Figure. 4 Subsystem “Preparation” 
Source: own work
On the other hand, Figure 5, in cycles B3 and B4, relates to the second subsys-
tem of “incidents detection and analysis”. It is the first step in the  incidents response 
and implies the need to identify the different attack vectors since any cybersecurity 
incident must be detected in the shortest possible time so as to minimize the impacts 
that may derive from it [30]. A cybersecurity incident materializes when it is directly 
or indirectly affected by what is known as the triad of “Confidentiality, Integrity and / 
or Availability” (CIA) [31], so that its early detection is a critical success factor in the 
minimization of impacts [32]. Similarly, the more incidents occur, the higher the detec-
tion level of the attack vectors must be. Any attack is developed in a specific scenario 
that may or may not have coverage or scope in a whole network, for which, it must 
determine the actual distribution of the scenario where it occurs so as to limit and / 
or define the actions required to respond to it. In other words, a punctual analysis of 
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each of the attacks and correlations with other incidents or events must be performed 
to determine the next steps to contain and eradicate them.
Processes, policies and
procedures deﬁnition
Conformation of
cybersecurity team
Hardware and
software tools
acquisition
Cybersecurity
team training
B1
B4
B3
B2
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
-
Cyber assets assurance
Organizational
cybersecurity risk
perception
Incident prevention
Incident detection
and analysis
Attack vector
identiﬁcation
Analyze the
scenario distribution
Activities during
the attack
Figure 5. Grouping of subsystems: Preparation, Detection and analysis 
Source: own work
In the third subsystem, in Figure 6, “Activities during the incident”, all the specific 
activities are developed to reduce the life-time of the incidents and return the network 
to optimal operating conditions and minimize the impacts derived from the techniques 
of attack [33] as observed in the reinforcement cycle R1. For this it is necessary to be 
able to have clarity and definition of current containment and eradication strategies 
and be able to build new ones, in an agile way, depending on the different types of 
attack. Each strategy must consider the type of decisions that must be made about 
cyber-assets and even about people in such a way that the necessary evidence of 
the attack is preserved for its subsequent analysis and, if appropriate, judicialization. 
Thus, all the incidents, once identified and analyzed, must be contained and eradicated 
in the shortest time possible, in order to minimize the effects that derive from them. 
Containment can be considered as an element that does not solve the root of the inci-
dent, for example, to isolate the affected cyber-assets of the network, while eradication 
supposes the elimination of the problem of the network [33]; for this reason, they are 
considered as individual elements within the system. Finally, once the incident has 
been eradicated, it is necessary to restore the system to the normal state of operation, 
with the necessary corrective measures so that, at least, the same incident does not 
materialize again [33].
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Figure 6. Grouping of subsystems: Preparation, Detection and analysis 
and Activities during the incident 
Source: own work
The last subsystem, “Post-incident Activities” of Figure 7, which can be observed 
in cycle R2, should allow for the collection of the lessons learned in the preceding 
subsystems, in such a way that it can generate knowledge about the activities carried 
out satisfactorily and those carried out inadequately, providing necessary elements to 
enrich the other components of the system in a holistic way [14].
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Figure 7. Grouping of subsystems: Preparation, Detection and analysis,  
Activities during the incident and Post-incident activities 
Source: own work
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The proposed causal diagram develops the four main components of the inci-
dent response life-cycle proposed by NIST, which can be analyzed as complementary 
subsystems, which provide an approximation to the understanding of the problem. 
Figure 8 groups them in the following tables:
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Figure 8. Causal diagram grouped with respect to the life cycle of incident response 
Source: own work
Validation 
Modeling with SD requires iterative processes that start from the definition of the 
model and can extend even after the implementation of the policies derived from it. In 
this sense [34], it is essential to validate the model to verify the adequacy of the model, 
regarding some variables, allowing the analysis of the defined relationships and the 
logical and experimental reality. So [34] states that the validation in SD includes two 
components, defined as the validation of the structure of the model and the validation 
of the behavior of the results of the model
For this exercise, it was proposed to analyze: dimensional consistency, extreme 
conditions, integration error tests and sensitivity analysis.
•	 Dimensional Consistency: The units of the variables defined in the model 
were verified, finding coherence in the defined units.
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•	 Extreme conditions: Zero received events were assumed, within the ne-
gative binomial distribution associated with the rate of events received, 
observing an adequate behavior of the system where the initial unprepared 
events are evacuated and the curve tends to zero, as evidenced by Figures 
9 and 10. It should be noted that events are considered a discrete variable, 
since they exist or do not exist and are always greater than or equal to zero. 
Likewise, it was assumed that there were no people in the team, finding that 
the detected unforeseen events correspond to the input data of events, that 
is, both distributions are very similar, as shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 9. Rate of events received in extreme conditions 
Source: own work
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Figure 10. Number of events in extreme conditions
Source: own work
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Figure 11. Total number of events and non-prevented events  
in extreme conditions with zero (0) people
Source: own work
Likewise, extreme times were assumed for the detection of incidents, observ-
ing a greater number of unforeseen events or incidents, as shown in Figure 12. This 
corresponds to the expected reality, since the later the detection time for an event, the 
greater the number of events that can become incidents.
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Figure 12. Rate of non-prevented events with extreme impact of detection time 
Source: 
•	 Integration error tests: the model was executed with the integration types 
Euler, RK4 Auto, Difference, RK2 Fixed, Rk2 Auto and RK4 Fixed and no 
sensitivity was shown in the results of the model as shown in Figure 13.
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•	 Sensitivity analysis: The sensitivity analysis helps identify significant 
changes in the conclusions when the assumptions vary significantly [21].
The sensitivity analysis was performed under triangular distributions of the 
parameters that are identified in Figure 14 and with 1000 iterations.
Figure 14. Definition of parameters for sensitivity analysis and their distributions
Source: own work
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The results show that there is a 95 % probability that the data will behave ac-
cording to the range found in the model, as shown in Figures 15, 16 and 17.
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Figure 15. Sensitivity for the rate of non-prevented events. 
Source: own work
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Figure 16. Sensitivity for non-prevented events that were detected
Source: own work
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Figure 17. Sensitivity for non-prevented events that were contained and eradicated 
Source: own work
The dynamics captured by the model show an increase in the number of events 
a company can receive under the initial conditions defined. Regarding the events, it 
can be concluded that they have a potential behavior, which increases the level of risk 
for the infrastructures of the organizations, including those critical as an unanticipated 
event or incident, that can compromise the continuity of the business or the CIA attri-
butes. In this same sense, it is necessary to develop sufficient mechanisms to detect, 
in the shortest possible time, the incidents that may compromise the cybersecurity 
of the organizations. Figure 18 reflects the behavior of the system under the modeled 
definitions, from the events received, to those detected events or incidents that were 
not prevented . It is evident that the detected unforeseen events are less than the 
events received in the defined period.
On the other hand, unforeseen events must be contained and eradicated in 
the shortest time possible to reduce the impact of the natural effects that incidents 
produce in terms of cybersecurity. In that sense, the contained events are relatively 
similar to the events that are detected. However, unforeseen events involve different 
times of attention and containment in terms of the RTO (Recovery Time Objective) 
and RPO (Recovery Point Objective) and the criticality of the immersed assets, as 
well as the complexity of the attack, so it is not possible to have the same amount of 
containment and recovery of the service. This behavior can be analyzed in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Events, non-prevented events, events in containment  
and events contained and eradicated
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Scenarios 
One of the most common tools for defining policies is the construction of scenari-
os. The main objective is to define the optimistic scenario and the pessimistic one 
regarding the parameters consigned in the model that allow for the comparison of 
the outputs of each of them so as to define policies that improve the solution of the 
problem [21].
In that sense, the model was simulated under the conditions of the pessimistic 
scenario and optimistic scenario that can be observed in Table 5, where it was pro-
posed to review the behavior under unfavorable conditions or lower than the initial 
situation modeled and in the same way, the values of the parameters were modified 
to strengthen the system and analyze it from the perspective of the best scenario.
Table 5.	Defining	scenarios	for	analysis.	
Parameter Initial Pessimist Optimist
Initial state of hardware and software technology 2 1 4
Conformation of incidents response team 1 1 1
Initial state definition policies processes and procedures 2 1 4
Initial number of people 7 7 8
Initial level of incident response team training 3 1 4
Initial Level of organizational risk 0.47 0.57 0.37
Source: own work
Pessimistic scenario 
In this scenario, the technology is assumed to have higher level of obsolescence, a 
lower definition of internal controls in terms of cybersecurity, understood as a lower 
level of policies, processes and procedures, a lower level of training and an increase 
in the risk level that can be determined by the complexity of the attacks. This facili-
tates the materialization of unforeseen events or incidents and therefore the impact of 
technology in general as well as critical infrastructures. Figure 20 shows the behavior 
of the system with the defined parameters.
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Figure 20. System behavior in the pessimistic scenario
Source: own work
The graph shows a greater number of events with a lower detection capacity 
and, therefore, a lower number of incidents contained and eradicated, which signifi-
cantly increases the risk of loss of business continuity, as well as affecting the CIA 
attributes.
Optimistic scenario  
Under this perspective, the detection number of unforeseen events is practically equal 
to the incidents that are generated, which reduces the possibility of materialization of 
damages to the technology, since early detection facilitates the operation or decision 
making for the containment of them, thus minimizing the risks derived from the at-
tack. Figure 21 shows the behavior of the system under the given conditions.
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Figure 21. System behavior in the optimistic scenario
Source: own work
It is, therefore, necessary to improve the analysis, containment and recovery 
times of the service that allows responding to incidents that are derived from the 
events against the network in such a way that the risks of affecting the technology 
and the business in its critical infrastructures are reduced.
Optimization strategy 
The Vensim’s tool of “Policies Optimization “, allows for the development a non-linear 
multi-objective optimization [9] of the elements defined in the system. The purpose 
defined was to minimize the rate of non-prevented events and to maximize the rate 
of analyzed non-prevented events and the containment and eradication rates of 
non-prevented, oscillating between the parameters shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Oscillation of parameters for the optimization of the policy
Minimum Parameter Maximum
1 Initial state of hardware and software technology 5
0 Conformation of incident response team 1
1 Initial state definition policies processes and procedures 5
1 Initial number of people 9
1 Level of incident response team training 5
0.3 Initial Level of organizational risk 0.9
Source: own work
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The maximum values  found by the algorithm used by Vensim are detailed be-
low. Similarly, Figure 22, helps review the behavior of the system under the conditions 
provided by the tool. It is striking that the level of organizational risk is a fundamental 
element in incident response and the protection of critical infrastructures, since they 
define the level of action of the companies, demonstrated through investment in tech-
nology, training of personnel and the definition of policies, processes and procedures 
aimed at addressing the risks of affecting the business due to non-continuity of opera-
tions or alterations to information. The results of the optimization are described below:
• Initial state of hardware and software technology = 5
• Conformation of incident response team = 1
• Initial state definition policies, processes and procedures = 5
• Initial number of people = 9
• Initial level of incident response team training = 5
• Initial Organizational risk level = 0.3
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Figure 22. System behavior with optimized policy
Source: own work
Conclusions  
With the above data, it is possible to conclude that the organizational risk levels rep-
resent a fundamental element for the management of incidents and the protection 
of critical infrastructures, since it allows for the definition of necessary strategies, 
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in terms of policies, guidelines, business rules, technology and other elements that 
help face the threats derived from interconnectivity. In this sense, it is necessary to 
develop policies aimed at organizational sensitivity in terms of cybersecurity risks, 
to have state-of-the-art technology that allows for the early detection of unforeseen 
events, to strengthen business policies and guidelines, and to support a qualified and 
permanent team trained, so that they can deal with the complexity of the attacks to 
which the companies are exposed.
It is necessary then to have sufficient tools —either procedural, manual or au-
tomatic—, that allow for the evaluation of the level of exposure or risk to organizations, 
trying to optimize the attention times of each of the non-prevented events, thus re-
ducing the possible effects to their technology by cybernetic attacks. That said, the 
protection of critical infrastructures will not only depend on preventive controls, but 
it is also essential to develop strategies for the early detection of incidents that allow 
for adequate action on behalf of the members of the organizations to attend to them.
As future work, it is proposed that the model be complemented with other 
elements defined in the CMM and systems excluded in this analysis, that assist in 
understanding cybersecurity in a holistic way and facilitate the creation of policies 
aimed at strengthening the security of companies and their competitiveness, mea-
sured not only individually but at the country level. Similarly, the model can be enriched 
by considering variables such as: the times and points of objective restoration derived 
from the continuity of the business and the business impact analysis, the criticality of 
the non-prevented event and therefore its priority of attention.
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